The following pages trace how farmers in Taiwan shifted their social consciousness, or world outlook as expressed in social interactions, from that of a moral economy to that of a political economy. This change was effected by the intrusion of government policies into farm society and by changes in the relations of agricultural production.

Specifically, this chapter claims that the attitudes of Taiwanese farmers towards landowners have been influenced, if not shaped, by social conditions which have changed dramatically since the Japanese occupation of the island in 1895. These changes in social conditions have come in three sets: monopoly capitalist production of sugar and rice, initiated by the Japanese; the land reform and reformation of the Farmers’ Associations by the Kuomintang (KMT) government during the 1950s; and the dissolution of farming communities in the face of the economic boon and rapid urbanization of the 1970s. These social changes led to changes in the social consciousness of farmers. First, the arrival of the Japanese shook the moral economy and social relations based on kinship of the traditional society. Next, exploitation by the Japanese regime provoked and then suppressed political activism. Finally, the position of landowners was diminished as the values of capitalism—especially individualism and the profit motive—permeated farming communities.

I shall highlight the changes in social relations and social consciousness by focusing on the distinctions between the traditional moral economy imbued with social feelings and the profit-oriented individualism of modern capitalism. This admitted simplification underlines the crucial impact of the shift to modern capitalism and the toll that change took on the social consciousness of farmers as their communities crumbled and gave
way to urbanization. While farming communities are not a panacea to the social ills of modern society, the collapse of the former certainly intensifies the gravity of the latter.

Since the Japanese occupation of 1895, Taiwan has undergone a twofold change, which can be seen in the basic economic strata of agriculture. First, Taiwan was brought under the aegis of capitalism. Taiwan, on the periphery, has been made to serve two centers—Japan in the pre-World War II period and the United States in the postwar period. The closed village community was opened to the logic of capitalist production and commercialization. Agricultural resources, including land and labor, which had previously been a sacred family inheritance, were converted into salable commodities and became mere agricultural investments for profit. Following the Second World War, Taiwan, along with Southeast Asia and other Third World nations, was duped into serving what Eric R. Wolf calls North Atlantic capitalism (Wolf 1969:276).

Second, since the Japanese occupation, the power of government has permeated deeply into Taiwan society; this infiltration has been accomplished by the investigation of traditional society and by control of land distribution. The KMT land reform of the early 1950s is a powerful and typical example of the influence of government on society. This example of strong governmental control can be compared to development under colonization of other Southeast Asian societies (Scott 1976), as well as to the situation of rural China in the nineteenth century (Hsiao Kung-ch’üan 1960). Only the commercialization of agriculture in Taiwan contrasts sharply with mainland China, particularly with the “introverted” villages of Hopei and northwest Shantung (Philip Huang 1985:304). Such comparisons, of course, cannot be expected to yield direct correlations.

The present essay traces changes in the social consciousness of Taiwan farmers since the Kuomintang takeover. The term “social consciousness” refers to the social dimension of human value systems and covers at least four aspects:

(1) attitudes about relationships among individuals;
(2) attitudes about relationships between the individual and the community;
(3) attitudes about relationships among communities; and
(4) attitudes about the society at large.

The nature of these relationships as well as the attitudes held vary with the social status of the individuals involved. For example, “relationships among individuals” for farmers include relations between the farmer and the landowner and among farmers themselves as well as the more usual relationships of family, friends, teacher-student, etc. In the case of Taiwan
farmers, "relationships between the individual and the community" refer especially to those between farmers and farmers' associations. Thus the meanings of these relationships are unique to agricultural society.

Moreover, these relationships are mutually interdependent. For instance, the ostensibly individual relations between the farmer and the landowner develop within a context that includes individual-community relationships and, frequently, kinship relationships, and cannot be considered outside of this context. Thus "each such peasantry—Haiti, Jamaica, etc.—is the product of specific historical events; each functions within state systems that are different in character, and in the sort of pressure they pose upon rural citizens, each faces a markedly different future" (Mintz 1973). Because of the complexity of the topic, this study will focus on two aspects of rural social consciousness in the period following the Kuomintang takeover:

(1) Changes in farmers' attitudes towards landlord-farmer relationships; and
(2) changes in farmers' attitudes towards farmers' associations.

These two attitudinal changes typify the trends in the social consciousness of Taiwan farmers, and they are associated with two instances of land reform—one in the 1950s and the other in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, the data (both primary and secondary) relevant to these two questions are fuller than those related to other aspects and permit a more detailed investigation.

Formation of Taiwan Farmers' Social Consciousness in the Early Period of Retrocession

Historical Background

In order to understand landowner-farmer relations during the land reform of the early 1950s, we must briefly consider the trend towards capitalism and the concentration of land into the hands of the few in Taiwan under Japanese imperialism.

Following its occupation of Taiwan in 1895, Japan accomplished a monetary reform (1904) and an investigation of land (1905), constructed a railroad system traversing the island from north to south, and opened the harbors at Keelung and Kaohsiung. All of this, as Yanaihara Tadao has shown, was designed to turn Taiwan into a capitalistic society in order to facilitate its exploitation (Yanaihara 1985:13).

Japanese capitalists controlled four large sugar companies, fifteen alcohol distilleries with a private railroad system stretching 2,900 miles, and
rice production (Yamanabe 1972:48). These modernized sugar operations occupied 78,601 chi a (the Taiwanese unit of land measurement, one chi a equals 0.9699 hectare), which combined with leased farmers who occupied 25,237 chi a, to total 103,838 chi a (1926 statistics). This is more than one-eighth of the land of Taiwan. In Hualien Kang District, Yen Shui Kang Sugar operations possessed 78,601 chi a, more than one quarter of the entire cultivated land of Hualien Kang District, the tillable lands being 5,001 chi a. Again, all sugar companies were controlled by Japanese capitalists (Yanaihara 1985:26).

The rice economy in Taiwan also followed this trend towards capitalism, giving the development of capitalism under the Japanese occupation a multi-dimensional significance in Taiwan history. As Yanaihara Tadao points out, these developments transformed the feudal society of Taiwan into a modern capitalistic society, ripe with class and racial tensions (1985:99-100).

Backed by the strength of the Japanese government and capital, Japanese people held positions in the bureaucracy as well as acting as capitalists and as bank and company employees; farmers and laborers were mostly Taiwanese. Between them, were two contending groups of middle class merchants and industrialists, one Japanese and the other Taiwanese. Naturally, the Japanese middle class allied itself with the elite class of officials and capitalists, while the Taiwanese middle class was treated as part of the governed class, along with Taiwanese farmers and laborers. In addition to these antagonisms between the governing and the governed, and between the capitalist and farm and laboring classes, were racial tensions provoked by differences in language, culture, national origin, attitude to life, etc.

These racial and class struggles naturally intensified the suffering of Taiwan farmers, and promoted the development of their group consciousness. On June 28, 1926, they formed the Association of Taiwan Farmers, with branch offices throughout the island; the association spoke out against capitalistic enterprises and provided assistance for local opposition to the Japanese. This was the first noteworthy expression of Taiwan farmers' group consciousness prior to the Kuomintang takeover.

The second major trend of the Japanese occupation was the concentration of farmland into relatively few hands. As the number of small landowners decreased, the number of large landowners increased. Between 1921 and 1932, the number of households that owned less than one chi a declined from 259,642 (64.08%) to 201,913 (59.26%) while the number of holdings larger than 50 chi a increased from 572 (0.14%) to 775 (0.23%) (Table 5.1).

In terms of the acreage of tillable land, Table 5.2 (based on data from April 10, 1939) shows that the 224,929 households tilling less than one chi a
### TABLE 5.1 Owners of Land in Terms of Acreage, 1921 vs. 1932

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Holding (chia)</th>
<th>Number of Households 1921</th>
<th>Number of Households 1932</th>
<th>Percentage of Owners 1921</th>
<th>Percentage of Owners 1932</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 0.5</td>
<td>172,931</td>
<td>130,732</td>
<td>42.68</td>
<td>38.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5-1.0</td>
<td>86,711</td>
<td>71,181</td>
<td>21.40</td>
<td>20.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0-3.0</td>
<td>99,151</td>
<td>91,524</td>
<td>24.47</td>
<td>26.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0-5.0</td>
<td>23,276</td>
<td>22,641</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>6.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0-10.0</td>
<td>14,891</td>
<td>15,324</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.0-50.0</td>
<td>7,649</td>
<td>8,497</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 50.0</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>405,181</td>
<td>340,674</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chou Hsien-wen 1956: 90.

### TABLE 5.2 Tillers of Land in Terms of Acreage, Taiwan, 1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Holding (chia)</th>
<th>Households Number</th>
<th>Households Percent</th>
<th>Acreage (chia) Total</th>
<th>Acreage (chia) Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 0.5</td>
<td>127,998</td>
<td>30.23</td>
<td>33,745</td>
<td>4.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5-1.0</td>
<td>96,931</td>
<td>22.87</td>
<td>69,667</td>
<td>10.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0-3.0</td>
<td>145,966</td>
<td>34.48</td>
<td>253,737</td>
<td>36.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0-5.0</td>
<td>33,342</td>
<td>7.84</td>
<td>125,574</td>
<td>18.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0-10.0</td>
<td>15,463</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>101,757</td>
<td>14.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 10.0</td>
<td>3,576</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>106,887</td>
<td>15.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;20.0</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>68,410</td>
<td>9.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>423,276</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>691,397</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chou Hsien-wen 1956: 91.

had land holdings totalling 103,412 chia, while the 3,576 households with more than 10 chia had holdings totalling 106,887 chia. In addition, the majority of that land was held by households owning more than twenty chia, with 579 households holding an amazing 68,410 chia. In other words, 53.10% of farmers held a mere 14.96% of the land, while 0.13% of farmers owned a hefty 9.90%. A large part of the farmland was concentrated in a few hands, while the majority of farmers worked small, insufficient plots (Chou Hsien-wen 1956:91).

Land ownership was a primary concern of Taiwan farmers during the Japanese occupation. As a result, the land reform of the early 1950s received widespread support among farmers.
Landowner-Farmer Relations in Farmers’ Social Consciousness During the 1950s

The retrocession of Taiwan to the Nationalist Chinese government in 1945, following the Second World War, had a tremendous psychological impact on Taiwan farmers. Arthur F. Raper’s report, based upon a survey of 1,176 farm households in 16 village communities throughout Taiwan, held that:

Generally speaking, the Taiwanese regard retrocession as the beginning of a new era, in which people’s lives will be improved. This attitude manifests itself most clearly in the following facts: Local leadership finds people with stronger freedom and autonomy; people are better cared for by local officials, whose positions are in turn filled by more ordinary people; fertilizers and bean-cake are delivered on time to every eligible farmer, who has lower taxes and new official contracts; not a few farmers have purchased land during those forty-one years; the farmers also welcomed the implementation of the land reform act of “Land to the Tiller” (land reform policy) in 1952, etc. In addition, the mortality rate has dropped as the educational level rises, and the number who possess modern equipment (except for radios) has increased. All this has exerted a tremendous influence on farmers and their lives. For people’s work efficiency and accomplishments are in large measure decided upon by their psychological motivations (Raper 1953:223).

As in other countries (Tuma 1965:ch. 12), the 1950s land reform in Taiwan was implemented more for political considerations than for purely economic reasons. The land reform program was put into practice through a three-step policy that started in 1949; this included a rent reduction program, the sale of public land to cultivators and tenants, and the Land to the Tiller Program.

One of the main reasons why land reform was able to win the widespread support of the farmers was that it was in concert with their own aspirations towards the retrocession. At the same time, however, many documents attest to an increase in tensions between landowners and farmers as a result of the reforms.

Farmers reported to government observers of the land reform that some landowners (such as those in Yünlin County) used various methods to reduce their holdings in the district records to zero before the enactment of the reform to avoid losing all of their lands in fact. Farmers proposed that the government institute a policy that recognized and rewarded those landowners who cooperated with the reforms while punishing those who sought to subvert land reform (Teng Hsuéh-p’ing 1954:135). As the following eyewitness report shows, these tensions sometimes resulted in violence (Teng Hsuéh-p’ing 1954:135).
We found in Yünlin County a very bad landowner. He did not obey the government’s Land to the Tiller policy nor did he listen to government arbitration efforts to reduce the rent. He even hired some vagabonds and beat up his tenant Mr. Li. Later the district government sent a Mr. Kuo, head of the Department of Land, to advise and negotiate with him, whereupon he instigated some thugs to beat Mr. Kuo. Fortunately Mr. Kuo was keen enough to manage himself out of the situation and report the matter to the police station nearby. Officers then arrested those ruffians and sent them to the court for arraignment. Many farmers angrily protested that the investigation and arraignment should be extended to the landowner himself; and indeed I feel that the farmers are right and the landlord must be interrogated.

Many similar incidents happened. Many farmers near the city of Kaohsiung complained to one government observer that the lands collected for redistribution were few while those kept by the original owners were many. As this observer reported in 1954, the city of Kaohsiung included more than 10,500 chia, of which 7,000 chia were tillable lands. Among this tillable land, 3,756 chia were privately owned, and 2,540 chia were privately leased; the government had collected only 1,022 chia, kept 810 chia, and exempted 704 chia. Thus, 50.8% of the lands were either kept or exempted, while the farmers received less than 42% of the land. Kaohsiung’s farmers felt it was unfair for any landowner to be allowed to keep more than 100 chia. When some landowners claimed their lands for buildings which never materialized, farmers requested the government to develop a decisive plan for the city of Kaohsiung that did not leave any loopholes for landowners to maintain their excess lands. They also requested loans to allow farmers to purchase land (Teng Hsiueh-p’ing 1954:108).

The above story was not merely limited to the farmers of Kaohsiung; rather, it was typical of the tensions between landowners and farmers throughout Taiwan. Such tensions persisted into the 1960s. In 1959, the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) invited academic economists and political scientists to follow up on Raper’s 1952 report and to reassess the situation in farm villages. The project was initiated by scholars from National Taiwan University and supplemented and completed by scholars from the University of Hong Kong. In the subsequent report, Professor E. Stuart Kirby described relations between landowners and farmers:

All 18 villages still have tenant farmers except for mountainous Jen Ai Village (which has none). The enforcement of the 375 Rent Reduction has resulted in a general increase of agricultural production while the levying standards remain as before, making it easier for farmers to pay taxes on time, although we still see some lingering ones paying taxes only after landowners’ urgings. One more important difference from the past is that those farmers are now in possession of written contracts.
Unfortunately, the landowner-farmer relation is now “frigid and forced,” the landowners having to give away their land to the farmers in conformity to the “Land to the Tiller” policy. Landowners initially were indignant and antagonistic to their tenants; recently such sentiments have subsided. According to the report at a discussion session among the local leaders, the landowner-farmer relation in 12 villages is now a mere formality, a cold contractual relation in which warm “feelings” are a thing of the past; the relation in 5 other villages is even worse.

In the past, on every festive occasion farmers used to bring presents to their landowners, whom they sometimes volunteered to favor with extra labor so as perhaps to win special treatments. Landowners in turn lent them buffaloes and money, or looked, among relatives and friends, for other jobs for farmers, or rewarded them with extension or even cancellation of rent for fields. Such a warm convention (based on custom and ignorance) has now completely disappeared, after the land reform act (Kirby 1960:71).²

In his 1957–58 fieldwork in a village in the Changhua district, the anthropologist Bernard Gallin also found that relations between farmers and landowners had taken on this “frigid and forced” character:

With the tenant’s security on the land protected, he no longer had to kowtow to his landlord or attempt to maintain good Kan-ch’ing. Today, it is common to hear a tenant, formerly courteous to his landlord whether he liked him or not, actually curse him when he comes in his own wagon to collect and load the tenant’s land rent. (The tenant formerly delivered the rent to the landlord.) On one such occasion in Hsin Hsing, K’ang, a landlord from another village, came to pick up his rice rent. In Mandarin, the name is pronounced K’ang, but in the local Taiwanese dialect, it is pronounced K’ung. But K’ung in Taiwanese also means stupid. The Hsin Hsing tenant, while watching the landlord load the rice in his wagon, laughingly repeated over and over for all to hear, “K’ung K’ung is here for the rent.” It was obvious to everyone including the landlord that the tenant was punning on his name. While the others stood around and laughed, the landlord continued his work without a word (Gallin 1966:95).³

Given these tensions, clashes between landowners and farmers were inevitable, and in fact they frequently occurred throughout the island. Starting on July 30, 1946, a Committee on Land Rent was established in every village to arbitrate disputes over rents and other land matters. These committees had nine elected members and two members appointed from the local government; the elected members included two landowners, two owner-cultivators, and five tenants, while the appointed members were the district magistrate, who served as the head of the committee, and the officer responsible for land matters at the district government, who served as the committee’s secretary. The selection of the nine
elected members was initiated at the grass-roots level. Farmers would elect their various representatives who, in turn, elected the nine committee members. Because, during the 1950s, farmers participated more frequently than landowners, the committees functioned quite effectively.

The type of arbitration followed by the Committees on Land Rent is historically significant in Chinese contexts and is different from what is commonly referred to as "government intervention and arbitration." As Dr. Hsiao Kung-ch’üan points out (1979), the reconciliation of disputants in rural China during the nineteenth century frequently bypassed government agencies. The reconciliation of disputes was non-authoritarian and voluntary, and formed an integral part of the indigenous social order. Arbitrators were persons who were respected and accepted by both sides of the dispute; the process did not rely on statutes or abstractions, but rather aimed at satisfying the wishes and feelings of all parties concerned, while being in accordance with the general opinion of the elders. In traditional rural China, even under totalitarian regimes, when formal arbitration broke down in the face of intrasocietal opposition, voluntary negotiations took over to supplement governmental procedures.

Such arbitration was rooted in the kin-based social structure that was fundamental to traditional rural society. In this situation, it was relatively easy to arbitrate disputes by "village contracts" (hsiang yüeh). Chu Hsi (1130-1200) of the Southern Sung edited and revised the following portion of the village contract of the Lu brothers of the Northern Sung.

In general, the village contract is fourfold: mutual exhortation over virtue and profession; mutual regulation of mistakes; social intercourse according to decorum and customs; and mutual assistance in distress. People shall recommend a virtuous elder as village headman, flanked by two assistants of learning and good conduct. These three shall take turns being on duty for a month. Three registered records shall be kept, and anyone willing to enter the contract shall be registered with a written document to that effect, which shall be kept by the person on duty until his month is over, when he shall report to the headman and turn it over to the next person on duty (Chu Hsi, ch. 74:13).

Such village contracts, arising from tradition, formed a nostalgic model for Chinese intellectuals interested in the reconstruction of farming villages. During the early years of Republican China, Liang Sou-ming (1892-1988) vigorously advocated the formation of a new structure for farming villages based on just such a village contract; he was eager to exclude governmental interference in this area.

Sadly, following the Kuomintang takeover, village contracts based on local autonomy were no longer possible in rural Taiwan. Instead, the government-sponsored Committees on Village Rent and Farming replaced
village contracts as the major instruments for resolving tensions between landowners and farmers. Prior to this, however, Taiwan farming villages under Japanese occupation underwent a transformation, similar to that described by Max Weber, from communities based on familial relationships to communities based on contractual relationships.

In fact, the enactment of land reform in the 1950s represented another such infiltration of governmental power into farm villages, reshaping their economic order while knitting together "state" and "society." At the same time, the socio-economic structure of Taiwan farm villages underwent a gradual transformation into capitalism. An example of this transformation can be seen in Gallin’s account of his 1956-57 fieldwork:

As the population increase continued in recent decades, and an already developing problem of land scarcity became even more extreme, it gradually became both necessary and possible for increasing numbers of rural villagers to migrate to the growing cities to find work to supplement their insufficient income from the land. This migration has broadened the villagers’ urban contacts and relationships beyond the village. At about the same time, the villagers have become increasingly more dependent and involved with the greater market economy. This has become especially true as patterns of land use have changed in response to all of the changing conditions, so that many villagers are increasingly shifting from what was primarily a subsistence form of agriculture to what is now participation in the market economy of the country. Therefore there has been an acceleration of the impingement on the village by the outside world.

As the villagers have begun to extend their activities and interests beyond Hsin Hsing, the village’s influence on the lives of its members has deteriorated even further. The increase in activities beyond the village means that the proportion of their total activities and hence their involvement within Hsin Hsing is decreased. While the tsu continues to perform many of its functions within the contest of the village, when its members—by necessity—become more involved beyond the village, even the tsu’s role must be affected. The still relatively small and rather localized Hsin Hsing village tsu have very limited influence or means to support their members in their needs and relationships beyond the village. And as the villagers seek to establish outside sources of solidarity and security, and the tsu is even further affected (Gallin 1966:271-72).

This description of a Taiwan farming community differs fundamentally from the closed world of semi-familial relations of agricultural villages in Hopei and Shantung provinces reported by Philip C. C. Huang in the 1980s (Philip Huang 1985:304). The Village Rent and Farming Committees which appeared during the 1950s are not only a product of the decline of traditional clan relations in farming communities, but also a reflection of the transformation of Taiwan farmers’ social consciousness. Gallin’s state-
ment that "the villagers have become increasingly more dependent upon and involved with the greater market economy," describes a shape of village society hewn by an axe of capitalism. Taiwan farming villages in the 1950s were already open to the market economy and were no longer closed village communities.

Traditional farming villages operate according to the ideals of the moral economy and subsistence ethics, based on norms of reciprocity and the right to subsistence, and abiding by the principles of "safety first" and "mutual assistance in distress." The effects of replacing a morality grounded in reciprocity with a political economy based on calculations of benefits (Popkin 1979) can be seen in the tensions between landowners and farmers in Taiwan. Since Taiwan farming villages are an "experimental station", their experiences in the transition from a moral economy to a political economy forecast what is coming for the rest of traditional Chinese society.

Two main factors can be cited in the tensions between landowners and farmers in 1950s Taiwan: the exploitation of farmers by landowners, and an increase in farmers' sense of security which was a result of the land reform. Instances of landowners exploiting farmers can be endlessly enumerated. What follows are five examples of the mechanisms used by landlords to exploit farmers while maintaining their positions and profits.

First, landowners took advantage of the fact that their contracts with the farmers were oral rather than written to alter the terms of those contracts as the implications of land reform became apparent. As Gallin found in his survey of Changhua villages, landowners routinely added rent to farmers' houses and created other charges to supplement the anticipated loss of income from field rents (Gallin 1966:94). Furthermore, landowners reinforced farmers' beliefs that past oral contracts, combined with their own diligent efforts, were sufficient to fulfill the conditions of land reform and allow them to till "their land" as before. Then, when no one appeared in court to claim the right to lease the fields, the landowner would claim that the land was his own and that he tilled it himself. When the farmer came to dispute this claim, the landowner would say that the farmer was merely an employee of his. Thus, many landowners retained their claims to the land.

Second, some landowners cleverly registered their fields under several names, each showing holdings small enough to be immune from the restrictions of the land reform policy. That this was a widespread phenomenon is testified to in a telegram (housed in the archives of Academia Historica), dated December 3, 1947, sent by the Taiwan Garrison Headquarters to the Taiwan Provincial Government. The telegram also states that a landlord-tenant dispute in Hsinchu County resulted in violence in which the farmer died (Academia Historica 1988:352-53).
Third, many landowners raised land rents to offset the new restrictions on land rent. As lamented in this petition to the Taiwan Provincial Government, "the bitter situation (of petty tenants) cannot be described by pen and paper. ... If the government does not take any legal sanction, the common tenants, having no lands to till, will become the jobless who stand on the starvation line" (Academia Historica 1988:86–87).

Fourth, usury was frequently practiced. For example, on the east coast, in 1953, farmers of Yu Li District were required to pay interest equal to the principal they had borrowed. One farmer, having a bad year, borrowed 2,000 chin of rice (1 Taiwan chin equals 0.6 kilograms), but the farmer was required to write that he owed the landowner 4,000 chin; this meant that at the harvest, 4,000 chin of rice had to be given to the landowner as payment of both the principal and interest. Later, the landowner demanded payment, with interest, of 4,000 chin of rice. A lawsuit ensued, and the court ruled in favor of the landowner, who could afford an attorney. This was a typical case; landowners who had time and money always won in court (Teng Hsiieh-p’ing 1954: 86–87).

The fifth and final example is similar, but more serious than the simple usury cited above; that is, the "sale of green sprouts". The price for 10,000 kg of rice sprouts was NT$4,000, while the price for 10,000 kg of rice was NT$14,000. In this scheme, farmers borrowed a certain weight of rice sprouts and paid back the value of an equal weight of finished rice. Farmers’ losses could go as high as 300% (Teng Hsueh-p’ing 1954:86–87). It is no wonder that "farmers labored throughout the year, only to see all their profit go to landowners’ hands" (official letter, quoted in Academia Historica 1988:740).

The widespread exploitation of farmers using methods such as these above contributed to the tensions between farmers and landowners. The second major contributing factor to these tensions, however, was the sense of security farmers gained through the land reform. As stated above, Japanese colonization pushed rural Taiwan into capitalist markets and led to the concentration of land into the hands of a few landowners. This situation increased the suffering experienced by farmers under the landowners. Due to a lack of secure rights to till the land, farmers brought their harvested crops to the landowners’ doorstep in an obsequious manner, hoping to maintain good relations, and hence access to the land.

Also, prior to land reform holdings were so small that farmers could not envision any chance for advancement. This can be seen in the holdings of five typical farming families residing in Kung-min Village, Hsi-tun Township, Taichung City, in 1953 (Teng Hsueh-p’ing 1954:27). The family of Lu A-chih included six persons and tilled 1.5 chia; the family of Ch’iu Fu-li included fourteen persons and tilled 0.65 chia; the thirteen members of the family of Lin Ch’iu-lin tilled 1.1 chia; Lin Ch’iu-shui’s family of four-
teen tilled 1.2 chin; and the family of Huang Tsu-hsiang, comprising ten persons, tilled 0.9 chin. Each of these families complained that "the land is small; the people many; the harvest is not enough to live on; life is without prospect of improvement" (Teng Hsüeh-p'ing 1954:27).

After land reform, farmers' lives improved. Consider the case of a Mr. Ho Yen in 1953, having already experienced land reform. His household included only two persons cultivating 0.8 chin of rice. They paid 1,800 chin for fertilizer, 1,000 chin for field tax, 2,000 chin for the land, NT$300 for water, house tax, and other fees. This left them with a surplus of 2,500 chin of rice which they could sell along with miscellaneous grains and cattle. This gave them extra money at the end of the year as well as an improved life.

The several steps of the land reform programs, such as the Sale of Public Lands Program, the Rent Reduction Program, and the Land to the Tiller Program, gave farmers a new sense of security. They no longer needed to kowtow to landowners, no longer needed to worry about an unexpected breach of contract or about the land being leased to someone else. This sense of security was another contributing factor in the tensions between landowners and farmers.

**Farmers' Social Consciousness During the 1950s—Farmer Association Relationships**

The second dimension of the social consciousness of farmers, their consciousness of themselves as a group, is wide in range. Lack of space and problems of documentation, however, require that our discussion focus on the relationship between farmers and their associations.

We begin with a description of the historical background of farmers' associations and their reorganization. During the period of Japanese occupation, farmers' associations were limited by the general conditions of colonization and exploitation in their ability to advance their own positions.

Following retrocession, in 1950, the Mutual Security Agency Mission to China and the JCRR jointly invited Professor W. A. Anderson, a rural sociologist from Cornell University, to come to Taiwan and study the situation of Taiwan farmers' associations.

In the meantime, in August, 1952, the Executive Yuan, in its Temporary Policy for Improvement of Various Levels of Farmers' Associations, issued a ruling that there should be two types of members in farmers' associations. Regular members were those who derived more than half of their total income from the profits of farming; they had voting rights, as well as the right to be elected to association offices. Associate members derived their incomes from other sources; they had no voting rights and only restricted rights to hold elected positions in the association (T. H. Shen 1970:76-76; Yager 1988:125-46).
In 1953, acting in accord with the proposals of W. A. Anderson, the Taiwan government, together with the JCRR, reorganized the farmers' associations so that they were controlled entirely by farmers, who were equally represented. The power of the associations rested in two assemblies, one of members' representatives and the other of executives, which were composed entirely of farmers. They based their decisions, and directed their operations, wholly on the needs and wishes of the farmers. The executive director was selected from, and answerable to, the assembly of executives; he made all appointments and oversaw operations. This corrected the mistakes of the past when all power was concentrated in the director's hands (Kuo Min-hsueh 1977: 10-17). As a result of this sweeping reorganization, Taiwan farmers' associations were able to expand the services they offered in a variety of areas, including sales, agricultural extensions, cattle insurance, and savings and trusts.

As reported by Kuo Min-hsueh, the reorganization, which was completed in 1953, clarified membership qualifications, distributed responsibilities evenly, and fostered a sense of cooperation among farmers. This contrasted sharply with the Regulations on Taiwan Farmers' Associations instituted by the Japanese in December, 1908. Under those controls, the farmers' associations had only two main areas of operation, purchasing rice for the government and distributing fertilizer. Now, the associations are genuine 'farmers' cooperatives, serving a wide variety of members' needs, while fostering a strong sense of autonomy and mutuality (Kuo Min-hsueh 1982: 29-33). In addition, all representatives and executives are directly or indirectly elected by farming people.

The membership of farmers was also dramatically increased. In 1949, an island-wide survey showed the degree to which the landlord class dominated the business of farmers' associations. In the one hundred associations surveyed, landlords held 39.7% of the supervisory positions or seats on the boards of directors, while owner-cultivators held 34.9% and semi-owner-cultivators held 0.9% (Department of Agriculture 1950: 21-22). In 1952, Raper's report on sixteen villages revealed that leadership positions were still in the hands of landowners and big farmers. Most of the heads of villages, of boards of village representatives, of farming associations, and of women's associations were wealthy merchants (Raper 1953: 58-69).

Kirby's 1960 report (using the same methodology as Raper's) showed that the number of members of farmers' associations in various villages had increased by more than 23%, from 589,299 to 726,681. In those village districts where the power of the farmers was strong, the percentage of regular members (active cultivators) was greater than the two-thirds required by the membership regulations; for example, in Hsin P'u the regular mem-
bers accounted for 79% of the membership, in Ch’ao Chou 77%, in Chung P’u 75%, and in Hsi Hu 75% (Kirby 1960: 85).

The enforcement of the Land to the Tiller Program of 1953 also saw an increase in the percentage of farmers holding executive positions. Where owner-cultivators had held 82% of these positions in 1953, they held 85% in 1957; at the same time the percentage of executive positions held by tenants shrank from 17% in 1953 to 13% in 1957. For example, 61% of the comptroller’s positions were held by owner-cultivators in 1953, while they held 64% of those positions in 1957. Associate memberships decreased from 26% in 1953 to 24% in 1957, while tenant memberships decreased from 12% in 1953 to 11% in 1957 (Kirby 1960: 85).

These statistics indicate a dramatic intensification of a sense on the part of farmers of belonging to, and of identification with, their associations. This conclusion is substantiated in the 1952, 1955, and 1959 reports of Kuo Min-hstieh. In these reports, Kuo found that those who regarded the farmers’ associations as belonging to farmers, or to the members, rose from 17% in 1952 to 56.1% in 1955 and again to 79.5% in 1959 (see Table 5.3). The percentage of those who acknowledged themselves to be members of the associations increased from 20.7% in 1952 to 85.6% in 1955 and to 94.2% in 1959 (see Table 5.4). Also, the percentage of those who held stock in the associations increased through the years (see Table 5.5). In like manner, the percentage of farmers who participated in meetings increased from 27.6% in 1952 to 57.2% in 1955 and to 82.0% in 1959 (Kuo Min-hsüeh 1984:148). Farmers who knew that associations’ boards of directors were elected by farmers increased from 20.7% in 1952 to 66.5% in 1955 and to 80.2% in 1959; and finally, those who knew that the members’ representatives were elected also increased from 32.8% in 1952 to 72.4% in 1955, and 82.7% in 1959.

This increase in farmers’ sense of identification with their associations was due to the strict regulation of memberships, making the associations truly farmers’ groups, and to the expansion of the services they offered. Kuo Min-hsüeh reports that the percentage of farmers who replied affirmatively to the question, “Have you, during this year, received any visits and services from service personnel of the Farmers’ Association?” rose from 27.6% in 1952 to 46.1% in 1955, and to 74.2% in 1959.

Perhaps because of the variety of services offered by the associations, many farmers expressed a desire to become association members. Their wishes were often expressed in the statements of their representatives. For instance, in 1954, Lin Chin-sheng, a member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, proposed to Chin Yang-kao, then Head of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry, that, “Qualifications for membership should be tightened to admit only those who are truly farmers. At present, many farming folk are unable to become members, while some members till
only vegetable gardens of a fraction of an acre" (Taiwan Temporary Provincial Assembly 1954:1,445). This keen interest in the membership of farmers’ associations reflected the farmers’ strong sentiment towards their association. This was the second aspect of social consciousness among Taiwan farmers in the 1950s, which went along with the first aspect, the tension between landlords and tenants.

Unfortunately, farmers’ associations have also been organizations for the implementation of government policy, the routes whereby the influence of the government infiltrates farming villages. This has been true since the first association was established in San-hsia Township, Taipei
County, in 1899. The Kuomintang takeover of Taiwan and the reorganiza-
tion of the associations did not change this, although, in name, the associa-
tions belong to the farmers.

No wonder that disputes and wrangling often occurred between farm-
ers' associations, which are really organizations of the government, and
farmers' cooperatives, which are genuinely organizations of farmers. In
the early years of Kuomintang rule, the farmers' writer, Wu Cho-liu,
served in the Social Department of the Provincial Government, and inves-
tigated one such dispute in the Taichung area (Wu Cho-liu 1987:240–41).
In this case, the association's distribution of fertilizer in exchange for rice
(Ho 1978:153; 180–84) was a clear example of an association being used as
the government's hand in the "developmental squeeze" (Lee Teng-hui

This testifies to the double character of the development of farmers' as-
ociations which reflected both Taiwan farmers' strong sense of identity
and the infiltration of government influence into farming communities.

Social Consciousness Among
Taiwan Farmers During the 1970s

Development of Attitudes Toward Joint Management

From the middle of the 1950s onward, Taiwan experienced rapid indus-
trialization, which was correlated with a decline in the economic impor-
tance of agriculture. As I have dealt with these changes elsewhere (Liao
Cheng-hung et al. 1986, ch. 1), I will not treat them here.

What we are interested in now is the concomitant change in social con-
sciousness among Taiwan farmers. The tensions between landowners and
farmers that had developed during the 1950s gradually dissipated in the
1970s; this was primarily due to economic development, urbanization,
and the influences of the mass media.

Research reported in 1964 and 1978 among eight villages in Mu Cha,
Shen K'eng, etc. in Taipei County, concluded that, as the impact of four-
ten years of steady economic improvement set in, residents experienced
a lower degree of social intercourse. At the same time, their attitudes to-
wards education and the marriage of their children became more prag-
matic and civilized, while their attitudes towards geomancy and the gods
were shaken; the one exception to this latter point was ancestor worship,
which held on (Chu Ch'ien et al. 1984:190–91). These results were typical
of changes experienced throughout Taiwan.

The most significant development since the 1970s, however, has been
in farmers' attitudes towards joint management. This new form of man-
agement was developed in response to a decline of tillable land and in the
size of the agricultural labor force, combined with a rise in the overall age of farmers. In the early 1970s, the government established workshops on joint management, and in 1980, enacted the Second-stage Land Reform, which stressed the expansion of large agricultural operations. The plans were put into effect in one village in each of five counties of T'ao-yüan, Tai-chung, Yün-lin, Tai-nan, and P'ing-tung. In July of 1980, this was expanded to an additional five areas in T'ao-yüan, Hsin-chu, Chang-hua, Yün-lin, and Chia-i. Two similar plans were put into effect in 1982 and 1983. These plans all involved some form of joint management, where the landowners entrusted the agricultural operations of their lands to a management team.

Farmers responded to these operations enthusiastically, as can be seen in this journalist's report from January, 1971:

Recently the Department of Agriculture and Forestry planned a joint management operation in an area of 100 chia of inundated fields in Lun Tzu Shang near Hsiu Shui Village. Every farmer in and around the area warmly welcomed the plan. Farmers in Hsiu Shui Village wondered aloud why the government did not choose their area.

The plan is a new idea. Each farming household still owns its plot of land; they offer their fields for joint farming and management without asking questions until harvest. After the yields are counted up, each farming household receives its share of the harvest (Wu Feng-shan 1971).

This enthusiasm gradually spread throughout Taiwan. The idea of joint farming was not entirely new, however; joint farms were in existence in Taiwan during the early years of the Kuomintang regime. According to a 1951 report of the Land Reform Investigation Group, there were 132 community farms in Taiwan. The most highly organized of these was Chiu Ju in P'ing-tung County. This community was originally established by the Japanese government for retired military personnel. Its thirty-eight households farmed 230 chia, of which less than one-fifth was inundated fields, and the rest dry fields. The village had wide roads, tidily arranged houses, and well groomed backyards. With a tasteful dotting of trees and shrubs providing shade all around, this community was truly an idyllic farming village.

After the pullout of the Japanese in 1945, the village was converted into Chiu Ju Joint Farm towards the end of June, 1947. One hundred households were regimented into a joint farming operation. Initially, they worked primarily according to a schedule, with secondary importance being given to the tasks at hand; management was difficult and efficiency was low. In 1950, they shifted their priorities so that the tasks received primary attention while the schedule was relegated to a secondary position. As a result of this change, they achieved high efficiency.
The community was highly democratic. Ultimate power resided in the people's assembly, which was divided into monthly assemblies and an annual assembly. The nine executive members were elected at the annual assembly. These executives met on the sixth of every month to examine the gains and losses of the previous month's operations and to plan the next month's business. Their decisions were submitted to the head of the community for implementation. The people's assembly also elected three comptrollers who met every other month. In addition, there were six other administrators who came under the aegis of the executives; these included the head of the community, the accountant, the manager, and the clerk. People were able to enter and leave the joint farm as they wished (Teng Hstueh-ping 1954: 278-79). This type of joint-management farm community gradually disappeared with the implementation of the Land to the Tiller Program, only to gradually reappear during the 1970s as a response to the difficult farm economy.

Data concerning farmers' consciousness and attitudes toward joint farming are scanty. We are forced, therefore, to hazard some hypotheses on the basis of a few secondary materials. In 1984, Ts'ai Hung-chin circulated some results from research conducted in 1980 and 1981 on government-sponsored joint farming. In analyzing these studies, we found that, since the 1970s, farmers have changed from their traditional family-centered consciousness to an orientation towards profits.

For example, among his sample of five hundred households, Ts'ai reports that when asked which factors would induce them, or others, to participate in joint farming, farmers saw market-oriented factors as having more significance than issues of family. Their most important considerations were the potential for mechanization, followed by the shortage of labor and the difficulty of recruiting workers in second place, and by the promotion of agricultural knowledge and skill in third. The demands and needs of relatives, friends, and neighbors were regarded as having the least significance in the decision (Ts'ai Hung-chin 1984: 28).

When asked about possible factors that could lead them or others to retire from or participate in joint management or group farming, those sampled selected their own shortage of labor as being most important, the lack of reliability of others in the community as second, and their own shortage of land as third. When asked why they cited lack of labor force as a factor inducing them to entrust the farming to others, they indicated that the question of the profitability of prices and the profitability of self-farming were the two most important factors (Ts'ai Hung-chin 1984: 31-32).

This shows that the farmers of the 1970s were profit-oriented, and that their coming together for joint farming was motivated by profits rather than by family relations. It must be admitted, however, that other reports indicate that the traditional culture and clan values exerted a great influ-
ence on farmers’ cooperative efforts, and that the influence was greater among the more rural communities. Rice paddy communities were more cohesive than livestock-raising communities. Also, in all these communities, those farmers who did come together shared the same surname or some kinship relations (Wen Ch’ung-i 1980: 96). In the final analysis, however, profits came to replace kinship as the basic factor in the farmers’ attitudes towards joint management.

This corresponds to a change in the farmers’ attitudes towards agriculture itself. Since retrocession, land has lost the sacred character it used to have for Taiwan farmers, and has become secularized; in like manner, farming has lost its character as a vocation (in the Weberian sense), and has become instead, merely a way to make a living (Huang Chün-chièh and Liao Cheng-hung 1990). Such attitudinal changes towards land and farming have much to do with farmers’ attitudes towards joint management.

**Farmers’ Alienation from Their Associations**

The alienation of farmers from their associations has, as its root, the second reform act of the associations in 1974. This act initiated two changes. The first change was to convert the shares farmers had purchased in their associations into “investments in the enterprise.” With this change, the government nullified all of the privileges and responsibilities towards the association that were represented by the shares. What remained of the relationship between farmers and associations was now only unilateral trade.

The second change in the reform act was in the method by which the chair of the board of directors was chosen. Previously, the individual holding this position had been selected by popular election. Upon the implementation of the reform act, the chair was selected by the government and appointed by the association. Although both of these changes were instrumental in alienating farmers from their associations, the question of the method of selection of the chair of the board was the more significant. Most of the criticism of the reform act was aimed at the selection and appointment of officers by the top governing levels (Liao Cheng-hung et al. 1986:198–201).

The seriousness of the alienation was evident everywhere. For example, in December, 1979, a journalist reported the complaints of the chairman of the board of directors of the farmers’ association in Heng Shan Village. According to the chairman, “Previously, the chairman of the board of directors was the farmers’ ‘big brother’; they would believe whatever he said. Now, the chairman says one thing, and the farmers immediately return with a rebuttal. You tell them to turn east, and they reply, ‘Why not west!’” (Chu Hung-lin 1979:3). In the same year, a working member at
Hsin Wu Village expressed a similar sentiment from the other side. "Most farmers have already lost their trust and interest in the work of the association" (Hung Chin-chu 1981:23).

The disorder and inefficiency due to the system for selecting officials were also factors responsible for farmers' sense of alienation from the associations. This was well enunciated by a member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly on June 27, 1978:

The organization of the associations can be said to belong half to the government and half to the people; it can also be said to belong neither to the government nor to the people. The associations' work and services are extremely disorganized. Besides, the organization of those associations are extremely vague; which level of organization belongs to which is never set down clearly. Everything is mired in bureaucratic entanglements (Taiwan Provincial Assembly 1982: 977).

Even the implementation of the system for selecting officials was in disarray. One Taiwan Assemblyman spoke to this in June, 1981:

Being selected by the selection committee as the top grade executive director of the association does not guarantee being appointed by the association. For he who was judged to be a second-rate executive director may get the appointment, and keep the job, in the executive meeting over which he has control. And control is obtained by "lobbying" those executives with drinks and vacations, the expenditures of which run from several tens of thousands of NT dollars to several hundreds of thousands, some even up to more than a million. This is obtaining votes by "competition in spending" (Taiwan Provincial Assembly 1982: 92).

This sort of administrative chaos inevitably led to the alienation of farmers from their associations.

**Conclusion**

This essay has documented transformations that occurred in farmers' social consciousness and attitudes. First, we examined the situation that resulted from the land reforms of the 1950s which saw the ascendency of owner-cultivators and the decline of landowners. We considered the ensuing tensions between these two groups and the identification farmers developed with their associations. These two phenomena were definitive of the social consciousness of Taiwan farmers in the 1950s.

Later, with the agricultural crises of the 1970s, we saw an enthusiasm for joint management and enterprises, accompanied by a shift from the traditional value system towards an orientation for profits. Eventually,
however, corruption in the system for the selection of association officers led to the alienation of farmers from their associations; this corruption involved both buying votes and using power to secure positions. Thus, the rise and fall of identification with joint enterprises constitutes the social consciousness of farmers during the 1970s.

Now, some discussion on the historical significance of these vicissitudes of Taiwan farmers' social consciousness is in order. This essay began with two trends that had been operating in Taiwan since 1895—capitalism, and the infiltration of the influence of government into society. These two trends reflect upon, involve, and influence each other. They explain the tension between landowners and farmers and farmers' devotion to their associations in the 1950s, as well as farmers' orientation towards profits in their joint management enterprises and their eventual alienation from their associations in the 1970s.

Capitalism presupposes a market-oriented economy. Everything is produced and traded on this basis. This system of economy is distinctly different from the farming society of pre-twentieth century China and from Taiwan farming villages of the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties. Taiwan's transformation to a capitalist system produced wholesale adjustments in the traditional cultural system and intense social dislocations.

In the traditional farming society, the leadership was made up of gentlemen and landowners, who were farmers, or "earthbound," as Fei Hsiao-t'ung phrased it (Fei Hsiao-t'ung 1939). Their resources were in immovable land. Once capitalism entered the villages, however, the leadership started to shift towards those who controlled movable resources (i.e. money). These were the merchants. Then the traditional basis of "moral sentiments" or "feelings for each other" also gradually disappeared from the relationship between landowners and farmers. For instance, Fried's example (cited by Wolf) of a farm village in Anhui province in 1949, where the mutual feelings between landowner and farmer had disintegrated to the point that military force was required to collect the rent (Fried 1953; Wolf 1969: 285–86).

This sort of social dislocation occurred, not only in the farming villages of mainland China, but also in modern Japan. The dislocations in Japan, however, did not result in revolution, but, rather, in the rise of fascism (Moore 1966:228–313).

The disintegration of the old order also allowed for the infiltration of the influence of both government and capitalism into farming society. In the forty years following the Second World War, these factors combined were directly responsible for the differentiation of class among farmers and for changes in the social consciousness of farmers. In the case of the expansion of the influence of capitalism in Japan following the war, class differentiation in Japanese farming society led to an increase in the num-
ber of both large and small landholders and to a decrease in the number of middle-class farmers.

The same holds true for postwar Taiwan. The expanding influence of market capitalism was directly related to the tensions in the relationship between farmers and landowners in the 1950s. The leading role played by the government in land reform and in education is especially noteworthy (Gallin 1963: 109–112; 1964: 313–23)

In fact, this active intrusion into rural society on the part of the government had been a common factor in Taiwan since the start of the Japanese colonial period. As Shiomi Shunji points out, during the first twenty-five years of Japanese rule, the police force was directly responsible for the implementation of economic policies, and they continued to play an indirect, but influential role during the latter part of the occupation (Shiomi 1980). Since the Kuomintang takeover, farmers’ associations have been completely under the government’s jurisdiction, and they have functioned to implement government policies. The strong commitment felt by farmers for their associations during the period of land reform in the 1950s collapsed with the onset of the agricultural crises of the 1970s precisely because of the political character of the associations. Thus, one can say that the character of farmers’ associations can function as a barometer to measure changes in the social consciousness of farmers.

All things considered, we can concur, with some reservations, with Ch’en Shao-hsing’s pronouncement that “Taiwan is a laboratory for the study of Chinese society and culture” (1979). But given the history of the past hundred years and the two crucial trends in the modern history of Taiwan—the expansion of capitalism and the infiltration of the influence of government into society—we can easily discern that the farming society of Taiwan is very different from rural society in mainland China. These differences are inevitably reflected in the thinking and culture of farmers. To delve into the historical significance of the differences between Taiwan and China, however, requires a comparative study of the last forty years of development in farming villages in Taiwan and China. Such a study is outside the scope of this essay.

Notes
1. The rapid commercialization of farm production in Taiwan is best revealed by the proportion of cash receipts/expenses to farm receipts/expenses. The percentages of cash in total farm receipts and expenses in 1958 were 39.8% and 59.0% respectively. However, the former became 90.5% while the latter became 91.8% in 1987. See Council of Agriculture 1988: 32.

2. For detailed discussions on the 1950s land reform, see Martin M. C. Yang 1970; Hsiao Tseng 1968; T. H. Shen 1968.
3. After land reform, many landlords, losing their lands and having no training necessary to change jobs, were drowned in the whirlpool of history. Gallin reports some of these sad cases. (See Gallin 1963: 109–112).


5. These “warm feelings” may be mere oil in the utilitarian engine of business transactions. Or, they may have been necessary, in the transactions of the traditional village, to mask deep-seated antipathy towards the landlord. Later, antipathy surfaced as traditional village transactions gave way to capitalist transactions where “warm feelings” were no longer required.

Both of these interpretations are possible. Two points must be kept in mind, however. The first is that “feelings” are notoriously difficult to document statistically, and the second is that the Chinese rural community—as is natural to human societies generally—was, and is, imbued with a conflation of the affective and the utilitarian. Our heart is where our treasure is. Where profit derives from the solidarity of the landlord-farmer relationship, the farmer’s affection is centered on the landlord. Where profit is diffused throughout the capitalist society, the farmer’s heart concentrates on the farmer himself. Capitalism and individualism go together. Whether in rural affection for the landlord or in capitalist attachment to individualism, our feelings belong to the useful and to the profitable.