

朱子思想中哲學論證與 歷史敘述之關係

黃俊傑*

摘要

本文之主旨在於經由分析朱子思想中「即歷史以論哲學」之特殊面向，探討中國思維方式之特質。本文之論述共分六節，第一至第四節分析宋代思想家所進行之歷史敘述常是他們建構哲學命題之重要手段，並指出：(1)、宋儒從三代典範人物如堯舜禹之行誼中，抽離出道德原則，認為這種原則既見於聖人之行止，又存在於宇宙之中。(2)、朱子以其「理一分殊」之理論背景，特別強調讀史以求理。(3)、朱子認為永恆的宇宙之「理」只有經由聖人之行誼才能被解讀。(4)、但是，朱子思想中這種「理」與「事」之合一，也只有通過對聖人行誼之研究才能被認識。本文第五節則針對前面四節中所提出之四項論點所可能遭遇之質疑，提出進一步之回應。本文第六節則綜合全文論點，強調中國思維方式之具體性與歷史性之特質。

* 國立臺灣大學歷史學系教授
中央研究院文哲所研究員

The Philosophical Argumentation by Historical Narration in Sung China: The Case of Chu Hsi

Huang Chun-chieh

If "argument" is defined generically as a process of reasoning, then we can claim that the Chinese people have been routinely practicing for centuries "argument by historical narrative." This essay explicates this fact by considering Sung Confucian thinkers, especially Chu Hsi (朱熹, Hui-an 晦庵, 1130-1200).

Argument in the West is typically centered on principles, and proceeds logically and axiomatically to a conclusion. Chinese "historical argument," in contrast, is oriented to paradigmatic persons, and proceeds historically, narratively, to debate and exhort. Western argument tends to go impersonal, axiomatic, and universal, while Chinese people extrapolate some ubiquitous and ever-abiding principles, they always have narrational paradigms in mind.^① They do yearn after principles, but the "one

^① Robert M. Hartwell calls such an "argument" "historical analogism." See his "Historical Analogism, Public Policy and Social Science in Eleventh-and-Century China," in *American Historical Review*, 76:3 (1971), pp. 692-727.

principle" (*li i* 理一) in their mind manifests itself only pluralistically, severally, historically (*fen shu* 分殊), never in its naked abstraction. The principle abidingly shines through refraction of legendary sages such as Yao 堯, Shun 舜, and Yü 禹, and is reflected in past paradigmatic events that historical narratives present.

We shall (A) first cite examples from the Confucian thinkers in the Sung (960-1279) times to instantiate the above characteristics of Chinese argument by historical paragon narrative, namely, it is an argument by historical narrative, by paradigmatic persons, and by collective memory. (B) Then, to conclude, we shall clarify such distinctive characteristics by considering our spontaneous queries on them, such as the relation between principle and person, principle and events, history and value.

I. Argument by Historical Narration among the Confucian Thinkers

Our concentration on Sung scholars is justified by two facts: First, Sung documents are unprecedented in quantity which are the largest in the official collection of all Chinese writings, i.e., the *Su-k'u Ch'üan Shu* (四庫全書)^② in the Ch'ing (1644-1911) Dynasty. The Chinese historical consciousness reached a new apex during the Sung times.^③ Secondly, the Sung thinkers were the first *explicitly* to

② Kao Kuo-hang (高國杭) found that, of all book summarized in the *Su-k'u Ch'üan-shu Tsung-mu T'i-yao* 四庫全書總目提要, Sung publications occupy more than one third of its 564 *pus* (部) and one fourth of its 21,950 *chüans*. See his "Sung-tai Shih-hsüeh chi ch'i tsai Chung-kuo Shih-hsüeh-shih-shang ti ti-wei 宋代史學及其在中國史學史上的地位," in *Chung-kuo Li-shih Wen-hsien Yen-chih Chi-k'an* 中國歷史文獻研究集刊, Vol. 4 (Ch'ang-sha: Yueh-lu Shu-she, 1983), pp. 126-135. esp. P. 127.

③ For the rise of the Sung historical consciousness, see Yoshikawa, Kojiro (吉川幸次郎), "Sojin no rekishi-ishiki—Shiji Tsukan no igi 宋人の歴史意識——《資治通鑑》の意義," *Toyoshi Kenkyu* 東洋史研究, Vol. 24, No. 4, March, 1966, pp. 1-5; Conrad Schirokauer, "Chu Hsi's Sense of History," in Robert P. Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer eds., *Ordering the World: Approaches to State and Society in Sung Dynasty China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 193-220. With strong historical consciousness, the Sung historians were very much fascinated with the study of T'ang history. For a latest treatment of this point, see:

argue for "principles (*li* 理)," so much as that the Sung scholarship was rightly called "*Li Hsüeh* 理學" (the learning of *Li*); thereby the Chinese historical scholarship in the Sung times becomes comparable to "philosophy of history" in the West.

The Confucian thinkers habitually regard the great Three Dynasties (Hsia 夏, Shang 商, Chou 周) as the Golden Ages in China, honoring them as the unerring judges of their current situation and guides to the future.^④ Furthermore, the Confucian thinkers concentrate their descriptions on three legendary sages, Yao, Shun and Yü. Such historical argumentation was typified by Mencius "who talked to him [Duke Wen of T'eng] about the goodness of human nature, always citing as his authorities Yao and Shun 孟子道性善，言必稱堯舜" (3A1),^⑤ and carried on by later Confucian scholars and the Sung Confucian thinkers.

We see four complementary characteristics in this reasoning. (1) Those thinkers discerned in their venerated sages some normative principles both embodied in those sages and endowed with cosmic and necessary universality. (2) For Chu Hsi, however, those principles are unintelligible and inscrutable without the various historical manifestations in the sages. And since few sages were followed since the legendary ages of those sagely rulers, history testifies to the dire consequences until "today." This fact all the more underlines the ubiquitous necessity of the One Principle discerned only through studying its varied manifestations in history. (3) Only by studying sages can we realize that these cosmic-historical principles (or rather this Principle) are/is to be found residing in the depths of our inner center—our "mind-heart" (*hsin* 心) to which we should strictly adhere. (4) But this fact of the coincidence

Wang, Teh-i (王德毅), "Sung-tai shih-chia ti T'ang-shih-hsüeh 宋代史家的唐史學," *Bulletin of the College of Liberal Arts, National Taiwan University*, 50 (June, 1999), pp. 307-238.

④ I argued on this point in my "Historical Thinking in Classical Confucianism—Historical Argumentation from the Three Dynasties," in Chun-chieh Huang and Erik Zürcher, eds., *Time and Space in Chinese Culture*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), pp. 72-85.

⑤ D. C. Lau, *Mencius* (Volume Two) (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1979), p. 92. Cf. his "Ancient History as Understood by *Mencius*," in his *Mencius*, pp. 324-333.

(without collapsing the one into the other) of inner mind-heart and external events can be realized only through, again, studying the wise ancients.

1. Principle in Things as Realized in the Sages

The Sung Confucian thinkers discerned by studying their venerated sages those principles embodied in those sages and endowed with cosmic and necessary universality. The great representative Neo-Confucian Chu Hsi insisted reverently to his ruler that ⑥

Thus the learnings of those ancient sagely emperors and enlightened rulers consists in the fact that they must go through 'investigating things to attain knowledge' to exhaustively understand the vicissitudes of things and events and find the rightness (*i* 義) and principles (*li* 利) therein, to let these subtle right principles thoroughly enlighten our inner heart's eyes without the slightest residues. And then our 'wills become integral (*ch'eng* 誠), our hearts upright,' of themselves, adequate enough to respond to the businesses of all under heaven; such is as clear as counting one, then, two, and as distinguishing black from white. If, however, whether learning or without learning, if we do not put a major emphasis on this [investigation of things to extend our knowledge], then the order of inner-outer and root-branch would be falsified and turn topsy-turvy. However, much intelligence or virtues we have, our sagacity is insufficient to clarify goodness, our knowledge is insufficient to thoroughly understand principles, and in the end they would be useless for influencing the world's affairs 'Extending knowledge by investigation of things' is what Yao and Shun said, 'concentration on one'; 'upright heart, integral will' is what Yao and Shun called 'holding on to the mean'.

⑥ Chu Hsi, *Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu Wen-kung wen-chi* 晦庵先生朱文公文集 (Taipei: Chung-wen ch'u-pan-she photo-reproduction of the *kinsei kanseki sakan* 近世漢籍叢刊 edition, hereafter as *Wen-chi*), Chüan 11, "Jen-wu Ying-chao Feng-shih 壬午應詔封事," pp. 643-644.

是以古者聖帝明王之學，必將格物致知以極夫事物之變，使事物之過乎前者義理所存，纖微畢照瞭然乎心目之間，不容毫髮之隱，則自然意誠心正，而所以應天下之務者，若數一二辨黑白矣。苟惟不學與學焉，而不主乎此，則內外本末顛倒繆戾，雖有聰明睿智之資，孝友恭儉之德，而智不足以明善，識不足窮理，終亦無補乎天下之治亂矣。……蓋致知格物者，堯舜所謂精一也，正心誠意者，堯舜所謂執中也。

And again, ⑦

The great essentials of the Confucians' learning consist in exhaustively understanding the principle(s). For every thing has one principle. We must first be clear on this point, and then anything that springs from our inner mind-heart (*hsin*), light or weight, long or short, would each has its own measure. As the *Classic of Documents* said, 'Heaven displays heavenly order, heavenly decree, heavenly punishment.' As Mencius said, 'Things are such, much more so with the heart.' Both refer to this point. If in this we do not first extend our knowledge, but only, seeing whatever makes our hearts [see], know whatever makes our hearts [see], drifting to and from without rules to go by, then how could what we store, what we issue forth, would of itself hit at the principles? As the Buddha's saying about …… carrying water and wood, if seeing no such heart, knowing no such heart, would in the end render us unable to enter the Way of Yao and Shun. This is exactly how, because we do not see the heavenly principle and just regard this mind-heart as our Lord, and so inevitably drift to selfishness.

儒者之學大要以窮理為先，蓋凡一物有一理，須先明此，然後心之所發，輕重長短，各有準則，《書》所謂「天敘」「天秩」、「天命」、「天討」，孟子所謂「物皆然心為甚」者，皆謂此也。若不於此先致其知，但見其所以為心者如此，識其所以為心者如此，泛然而無所準則，則其

⑦ Chu Hsi, *Wen-chi Chūan* 30, "Ta Chang Ch'in-fu答張欽夫," p. 1884.

所存所發亦何自而中於理乎？且如釋氏擎拳豎拂運水般柴之說，豈不見此心？豈不識此心？而卒不可與入堯舜之道者，正為不見天理，而專認此心以為主宰，故不免流於自私耳。

Thus studying things and events with a view to learning the principles hidden in them is crucial in making us truly wise and human, fit to deal with things under heaven, in short, fit to be ruler. But how do we study things and events to get at their principles? By learning from legendary sages and sagely rulers, studying things as they did, and in their perspectives look at the events of the world in their historic days. Thus naturally what the Sung Confucian thinkers said about "things and events" (*shih wu* 事物) came to refer mostly to those of sagely rulers, such as the following: Chu Hsi quoted Ch'eng I (程頤, I-ch'uan 伊川, 1033-1107) approvingly, saying, "In reading history, we must discern the subtle incipient dynamics (*chi* 機) wherein sagely rulers pacified conflicts and ordered the world, that dynamics in which the wise rulers freely went in and out of affairs. To discern all this is to 'investigate things' (*ko wu* 格物)."⑧ Then Chu Hsi told us that to investigate this vital source (*ch'i* 氣) in all historical vicissitudes, concentrated in the person of the sages, is to discern the cosmic Principle (*li* 理) by learning from the sage. In other words, we must look at history as sages did, not just mechanically amass information of dry chronicles which are mere useless "skin-surface of things" (*p'i wei wu* 皮外物).⑨ How do we concretely study history in the sage's perspective? "Read the Classics (*ching* 經)," says Chu Hsi.⑩

Reading the Classics is different from reading books of history. Historical writings are things of outside skin. Events can be insignificantly memorized and asked people about. If there is any doubts about the Classics, this cuts into

⑧ Quoted by Chu Hsi, *Chin-ssu Lu Chi Chu* 近思錄集註 (Ssu-pu Pei-yao edition), Chüan 3, p. 146, note. Our textual statistics shows that, in his *Chin-ssu Lu*, Chu Hsi adopted most Ch'eng I's sayings.

⑨ Li Ching-te 黎靖德, ed., *Chu Tzu Yü-Lei* 朱子語類 (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1981), Chüan 11, p. 300.

⑩ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

the self as sickness and pain. If you are cumbered with pain, you cannot for a moment forget it. How could it be compared with jotting down questions on paper while reading history writings?

看經書與看史書不同，史是皮外物，事沒緊要，可以札記問人；若是經書有疑，這個是切己病痛，如人負痛在身，欲斯須忘去而不可得，豈可比之看史遇有疑則記之紙邪？

How did those people actually read history? We can answer the question by illustrating it in Wan An-shih (王安石, Chieh-fu 介甫, 1021-1086), a famous reformer of eleventh-century China. Wang's advice to his ruler Emperor Shen-tsung (神宗 r. 1067-1084) was given entirely in the pulsatingly vivid historical events:^①

One day, the lectures were finished. Multitudes of subjects went. Emperor invited An-shih to stay and sit, saying, 'I have something to discuss with you in details with. Emperor T'ai Tsung of T'ang had to have Wei Cheng, Liu Pei had to have Chu-ke Liang, before they could have things accomplished. The two people are not at all out of the ordinary indeed.' An-shih answered, 'If indeed Your Majesty can accomplish the likes of the sage-kings Yao, Shun, then there must be [the likes of] Kao, K'uei, and Chi [with Yao, Shun]. If Your Majesty can accomplish the likes of Kao Tsung, then there must [the likes of] Fu Yüeh. Those two folks you mentioned are both shamed of by people with Tao; how could they be worth talking about? With the immensity of all under heaven, immense number of your people, hundreds of years of great peace, the number of scholars cannot be said not many, yet we always worry for lack of persons to assist with governance. This is because Your Majesty is yet to be clear on strategy of selection, yet to attain extension of empathic sincerity. Even though there exist wise men like Kao, K'uei, Chi, and Fu Yüeh, they will be covered

^① T'o-t'o (脫脫) et al., *Sung Shih* (*Ssu-pu pei-yao* edition), "Biography of Wang An-shih." For Wang's reform, see: James T.C. Liu, *Reform in Sung China: Wang An-shih (1021-1086) and His New Policies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959).

over by small men, only to retire and go away.' The emperor said, 'what age is there where we have no small men? Even in the times of Yao, Shun, there could not be without Four Villains.' An-shih said, 'Being able to discern the Four Villains and put an end to them was what made them Yao, Shun. If the villains were to let go of in their free reins of villainy, how could Kao, K'uei, Chi, would have been able to live on in their court positions?'

一日，講席。群臣退，帝留安石坐曰：「有欲與卿從容論議者。」因言「唐太宗必得魏徵，劉備必得諸葛亮，然後可以有為。二子誠不世出之人也。」安石曰：「陛下誠能為堯舜，則必有皋、夔、稷，誠能為高宗，則必有傅說。彼二子，皆有道者所羞，何足道哉！以天下之大，人民之眾，百年承平，學者不為不多。然常患無人可以助治者，以陛下擇術未明，推誠未至，雖有皋、夔、稷、傅說之賢，亦將為小人所蔽，卷懷而去爾。」帝曰：「何世無小人？雖堯舜之時，不能無四凶。」安石曰：「惟能辨四凶而誅之，此其所以為堯舜也。若使四凶得肆其讒慝，則皋、夔、稷安肯苟食其祿以終身乎？」

Noteworthy here are the graphic articulations of historical actualities of the ancient times when the sage-rulers knew how to maneuver their difficulties by sagaciously selecting and acting according to advisors he discernfully chose. But to say "choose wisely, act prudentially" so robs the entire throbbing life and crucial significance of the point as to be unintelligible. The entire advice collapses without the historical details. But the main purpose of historical details, looked at from the point of view of the sages who were involved in those situations, remain that of showing us who have eyes to see the principle shining through them.

2. No Events and Things, No Principle(s) as Realized in the Sages

The reverse of the above point is no less important. We can say it is even more urgent, for it is because of the total inability of our *unguided* mind to decipher the principle in the confusing details of the past and the present chronicles. In fact, left

alone unguided, the mind of the Way (*tao hsin* 道心) would be deranged, dissipated, and entirely lost in the bewildering maelstrom of brute factuality, historical and current events Chu Hsi put it:^⑫

A man is only this man, Tao is only this Tao, how could there be distinctions among the Three Dynasties, Han, and T'ang periods? But because of the stoppage of the Confucian truths, the mind-heart transmitted since Yao, Shun, Yü, T'ang, Wen, Wu now being not clarified to all under heaven, those rulers of Han and T'ang periods, although could not help but at times tacitly jibing [with Tao], on the whole operated only on desires for benefits. This was why there have been no unification since Yao, Shun, and Three Dynasties, since founders of Han and T'ang. If now we want to tear down walls and limitation, and become without distinctions between ancient and present, we must by all means deeply study the patterns of heart-minds Yao, Shun transmitted to us, the [self-] discipline (*kung fu* 功夫) to which Emperor T'ang and Duke Wen reverted, then assiduously seek-cultivate them in our own lives, with them as our rules and paradigms.

夫人只是這個人，道只是這個道，豈有三代漢唐之別？但以儒者之學不傳，而堯舜禹湯文武以來轉相授受之心不明於天下，故漢唐之君雖或不能無暗合之時，而其全體卻只在利欲上，此其所以堯舜三代自堯舜三代，漢祖唐宗自漢祖唐宗，終不能合而為一也。今若必欲撤去限隔，無古無今，則莫若深考堯舜相傳之心法，湯武反之之功夫，以為準則而求諸身。

Without such guidance of the sages, our mind-hearts would be dangerously insecure, unable to perceive the *Tao* that secretly operates in things. Chu Hsi insists on the importance of learning from the sages on the grasp of the *Tao* and, for this purpose, keeping intact their orthodox tradition (*tao t'ung* 道統), when commenting on the

^⑫ Chu Hsi, *Wen-chi*, Chüan 36, pp. 2315-2316.

Doctrine of the Mean, saying,^⑬

"When the divine sages of highest antiquity had succeeded to the work of Heaven and established the Supreme Norm, the transmission of the orthodox tradition (*tao-t'ung*) had its inception. As may be discovered from the classics, 'Hold fast the Mean' is what Yao transmitted to Shun. That 'the mind of man is insecure' and 'the mind of the Way is barely perceptible,' that one should 'have utmost refinement and singleness of mind' and should 'hold fast the Mean' is what Shun transmitted to Yü. Yao's one utterance is complete and perfect in itself, but Shun added three more in order to show that Yao's one utterance could only be carried out in this way……"

Subsequently sage upon sage succeeded one another: T'ang the Completer, Wen and Wu as rulers, Kao Yao, I Yin, Fu Yüeh, the Duke of Chou and Duke Shao as ministers, received and passed on this orthodox tradition. As for our master Confucius, though he did not attain a position of authority, nevertheless his resuming the tradition of the past sages and imparting it to later scholars was a contribution even more worthy than that of Yao and Shun. Still, in his own time those who recognized him were only [his disciples] Yen Hui and Tseng Ts'an, who grasped and passed on his essential meaning. Then in the next generation after Tseng, with Confucius' grandson Tzu-ssu [reputed author of the *Mean*], it was far removed in time from the sages and heterodoxies had already arisen……

Thereafter the transmission was resumed by Mencius, who was able to interpret and clarify the meaning of this text [the *Mean*] and succeed to the tradition of the early sages; but upon his demise the transmission was finally lost…… Fortunately, however, this text was not lost, and when the Masters Ch'eng, two

^⑬ Chu Hsi, "Chung Yung Chang-chü Hsü中庸章句序," *Wen Chi*, Chüan 76, pp.5599-5603. This is translation by Wm. Theodore de Bary in his *Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1981), p.5.

brothers, appeared [in the Sung] they had something to study in order to pick up the threads of what had not been transmitted for a thousand years, and something to rely on in exposing the speciousness of the seeming truths of Buddhism and Taoism. Though the contribution of Tzu-ssu was great, had it not been for the Ch'engs we would not have grasped his meaning from his words alone. But alas, their explanations also became lost……"

自上古聖神，繼天立極，而道統之傳，有自來矣。其見於經，則允執厥中者，堯之所以授舜也；堯之一言，至矣，盡矣！而舜復益之以三言者，則所以明夫堯之一言，必如是而後可庶幾也。

……自是以來，聖聖相承：若成湯、文、武之為君，皋陶、伊、傅、周、召之為臣，既皆以此而接夫道統之傳。若吾夫子，則雖不得其位，而所以繼往聖、開來學，其功反有賢於堯舜者。然當是時，見而知之者，為顏氏、曾氏之傳得其宗。及曾氏之再傳，而復得夫子之孫子思，則去聖遠而異端起矣。

……自是而又再傳以得孟氏，為能推明是書，以承先聖之統，及其末而遂失其傳焉。則吾道之所寄不越乎言語文字之間，而異端之說日新月盛，以至於老佛之徒出，則彌進理而大亂真矣。然而尚幸此書之不泯，故程夫子兄弟者出，得有所考，以續夫千載不傳之緒；得有所據，以斥夫二家似是之非。蓋子思之功於是為大，而微程夫子，則亦莫能因其語而得其心也。惜乎！其所以為說者不傳。

We note how the great Tradition of Way (*tao-t'ung* 道統) is "transmitted" to us only by way of personal words ("utterance") of those sages and worthies. We owe it to them to perceive the Way in the events of the world. We need them, in person, in their historical transmission, to be truly ourselves.

3. Principle(s) in Our Mind-Hearts (*hsin*) as Realized in the Sages

Without studying those paradigmatic individuals, we lose our paradigms of personhood, we lose our heart-minds in things around us. This losing of our mind-

hearts in things is too bad because our hearts of being are the spot where the Principle of things resides, or rather, precisely its manifestation. In his famous preface to the *Chapters and Verses of the Chung-yung (Chung-yung Chang-chü 中庸章句)*,¹⁴ Chu Hsi talked about how risky our heart-minds are without the guidance of the sages. Three points are to be raised here: (a). the Principle (*li* 理) that pervades in the universe is within us in our mind-hearts; (b). they will be lost without adhering to this Principle (*li* 理); all this is what the sages bequeathed us. Thanks to the discernments and achievements of our sagely paragons, we now realize that we are lost without the *Tao*, that we are the embodiment of the Principle (*li* 理), (c) and we must, simply must shine it forth completely unhindered in our understanding, our life-attitude, and our total life-praxis. Nothing is a worthier project in our life. In fact, our life and death, our communal survival, and ecological symbiotic prosperity hang on this single project. And all this beings at our inner mind-hearts.

4. One Principle in Things *and* in Our Mind-Hearts as Realized in the Sages

From the above two points, we realize that the principle is in things (points 1) and also in our mind-hearts (points 2), we may think that the principle of all things (including ourselves) is pluralistic and varied. Chu Hsi, who closely followed the sages' teachings, advised us that this is not the case. "The Principle is one while its manifestations are many (*li i fen shu* 理一分殊)." That is a pivotal saying of Chu Hsi's, difficult to understand as it is crisp and apt in summing up the entire thinking of Neo-Confucianism. We must see what it does not mean, then what it does. The saying does not mean that the principle in its raw form, as it were, is there somewhere, and its appearances in the concrete world are somewhere else, and that things are real to the extent that they manifest the principle. Rather, the saying does mean that many things are human mind-hearts, in their pristine state, are the principle, yet the principle

¹⁴ See supra note 13.

itself remains the same and identical throughout all to itself. Chu Hsi used the verbal phrase "[naturally] flows out (*liu ch'u lai* 流出來)"^⑮ to describe how the principle in the form of humaneness (*jen* 仁) naturally flows out to become many in many positions and levels of this world called "righteousness" (*i* 義), "rite" (*li* 禮), "wisdom" (*chih* 智), "sincerity" (*hsin* 信), while Wing-tsit Chan (陳榮捷, 1901-1994) the great Chu Hsi scholar of our contemporary world used "reflect (*fan chao* 反照)," as one moon reflects itself variously in many lakes.^⑯

How this "one principle in many manifestations" obtains in actuality is concretely and interestingly elucidated by Chu Hsi on two fronts, within the life of a person and within the history of rulership, all illuminated by the paradigms of the sages. First, as to the "one in many" manifested in oneself:^⑰

Someone asked: 'Why is it that the heart-mind of Great Shun is the same as the people's?' [Chu Hsi] said, 'The "good" is the public principle of the world, originally without the self-other distinction. But men have their selves (*shen* 身) and cannot but be partial each to oneself, thus come to have a self-things distinction. Only Shun's heart-mind had not a thread of selfishness in the self, and so could take the public "good" of all in the universe as "good," and did not know that "good" is in him or in others. This is the so-called "good being the same as people's." He discarded himself to follow others; this is to say that he did not put himself before others but listened open-heartedly [empty-mindedly] to the public [situation, trend] of all in the universe, hence "did not know 'good' being in oneself." He enjoyed taking what people take as "good"; this is to say that, upon seeing people's good, he with utmost sincerity and joy adopted it and

^⑮ Li, Ching-te ed., *Yü Lei*, 98, "I Kang Lu 義剛[錄]," p. 2527.

^⑯ Wing-tsit Chan, *Chu Hsi* (Taipei: Tung-ta T'u-shu Kung-ssu, 1990), p. 64.

^⑰ Chu Hsi, *Meng Tzu Huo Wen* 孟子或問, in *Chu Tzu i-shu* 朱子遺書, 5 (Taipei: Yi-wen Yin-shu Kuan photo-reprint of Ch'ing K'ang-hsi Chung Yü-erh Lü-shih Pao-Kao T'ang edition), Chüan 3, p. 9a.

practiced it on his life, hence, he did not know how "good" is in people. Both these point show how "good" is the same as people. Specifically, "discarding himself" means only that he selflessly going along with the principle, not that he had anything "not good" to discard. What "enjoy adopting-taking" means is only that he heart-mind is one with the principle, being at home in it and practice it; it does not mean that he had anything beneficial for himself to strive after.'

或問：「大舜之善與人同何也？」曰：「善者天下之公理，本無在己在人之別。但人有身，不能無私於己，故有物我之分焉。惟舜之心無一毫有我之私，是以能公天下之善以為善，而不知其孰為在己，孰為在人，所謂善與人同也。舍己從人，言其不先立己，而虛心以聽其天下之公，蓋不知善之在己也；樂取於人以為善，言其見人之善，則至誠樂取而行之於身，蓋不知善之在人也。此二者善與人同也。然謂之舍己者，特言其亡私順理而已，非謂其己有不善而舍之也，謂之樂取者，又見其心與理一，安而行之，非有利勉之意也。」

Then Chu Hsi turned his gaze at the sociopolitical ideal and the confusing political history of China:

We call Heaven the Father, Earth the Mother; this talks about the principle (*li*) being One. But while the heaven-and-earth being Parents of all under heaven, the 'parents' are parents of a person. Thus they cannot but be severally different. Similarly, taking the people as 'brethren' (*t'ung pao*), things as being with me, is to talk about them [from the viewpoint of] cosmic parenthood. This is 'Principle as One.' Then the talk of 'people' shows they are not really my brothers, nor things really my species. This is to talk about them [from the viewpoint of] 'severally different.'¹⁸

蓋乾之為父，坤之為母，所謂理一者也。然乾坤者，天下之父母也。父母者，一身之父母也。則其分不得而不殊矣。故以民為同胞物為吾與者，

¹⁸ Chu Hsi, *Wen Chi*, Chüan 37, "Yü Kuo Ch'ung-hui Shu與郭仲晦書," p. 2395.

自其天下之父母者言之，所謂理一者也。然謂之民，則非真以為吾之同胞。謂之物，則非真以為我之同類矣。此自其一身之父母者言之，所謂分殊者也。

Fifteen hundred years are all like this, going through days merely patching and fixing the status quo. During the period there were not without [days of] 'small peace,' but not a day passed without the Way transmitted by Yao, Shun, Three Kings, Duke Chou, Confucius, Being neglected in practice in the world. Yet on the permanent presence of the Way no one has anticipated. Only this is the thing that has been forever, in ancient days or today, always present, never perishing, indestructible despite fifteen hundred years of deeds of destruction by humans.¹⁹

千五百年之間，正坐如此，所以只是架漏牽補過了時日。其間雖或不無小康，而堯舜三王周公孔子所傳之道未嘗一日得行於天地之間也。若論道之常存，卻又初非人所能預。只是此箇，自是互古互今，常在不滅之物。雖千五百年被人作壞，終殲滅他不得耳。

Although worldly affairs are in the thousands and hundreds of thousands, really there is but one single Way, Principle. This is what is called 'Principle One, manifestations many.'²⁰

世間雖千頭萬緒，其實只一箇道理，「理一分殊」之謂也。

All in all, what is crucial is that "sages" in all their struggles in their historical situations are the clues, premises, and advises to our discernments, arguments, and achievements (such as self-cultivation and political management of a community), and their failures. This is what we have been describing, "argument by historical narrative."

¹⁹ Chu Hsi, *Wen Chi*, Chūan 36, "Ta Ch'en T'ung-fu答陳同甫," p. 2306.

²⁰ Li, Ching-te ed., *Yü-Lei*, Chūan 136, p. 3243.

II. A Reflective Clarification

It remains for us to clinch our description of Chinese historical argument by (5) first noting three points, answers to three possible queries. (6) Finally we offer our conclusion.

5. Three Queries and responses

First, we note three queries to our presentation of Chinese reasoning by historical narrations. They are mutually related and go as follows. As long as we discern and attain the Principle, we no longer need our guides and teachers such as sages and historical incidents. After all, secondly, history is "external skins" to be shed when real things come; sages are historical personage; therefore sages are dispensable outside skins of the really real. What we need, thirdly, is the Principle itself whereby we can judge who is the sage and who is not.

All above queries can be answered by the following explication of Chu Hsi's "Principle is one while its manifestations are many (*li i fen shu* 理一分殊)." The identical *Li*-Principle everywhere breathes its lively *Ch'i*-Breath everywhere as it wills, and the different *Ch'i*-vitalities in different individuals show forth in different levels of goodness in them. Commoners are "as good as sages" such as Shun,^② but commoners have turgid indolent *Ch'i* and sages, lucid redolent ones, and there is nowhere we can see the "one *Li* (*li i* 理一)" without feeling its "many separate (*fen shu* 分殊)" Breaths of Vitality (*Ch'i* 氣) in different individuals with different levels of

^② Chu Hsi, *Meng-tzu Huo-wen* 孟子或問, ed. in *Chu Tzu i-shu* 朱子遺書(5), Chüan 3, p. 9a. Shun is a "collective memory" *par excellence* in the Sung Neo-Confucian historical thinking. For "collective memory," see Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, tr. and with an introduction by Mary Douglas (New York: Harper-Colophon Book, 1950), p. 48, note 7.

moral achievements and manifestations.^② We must then vitalize our own *Ch'i* by trying to be infused and blown thoroughly, hopefully to the point of being saturated, with *Ch'i* in them. And so, free thorough blowing in us of the sagely *Ch'i*-Breath of one *Li* can take place *only* through our admiration, studies, and constant emulations of lives, attitudes, and actions of sages.

This point may still be hard to understand, but what this saying, "One Principle, different manifestations (*li i fen shu*)," insists on is clear enough. Three implications can be mentioned. First, we cannot afford to leave things through which we understand the principle, as if things were less real in themselves, mere dispensable props and aids to our understanding of the "real stuff," the Principle. How do we understand the principle through thing? We notice two more points: The Principle is "myself" as one of its many manifestations, therefore wherever it appears I in my undisturbed clear lucid state of mind would be able to recognize it *there*. Besides (and this is the very important third implication), sages are variously different from us (*fen shu*); they are the places where the same Single Principle in us (*li i*) is manifested in a concentrated form. They have in them more Principle manifested, paradigmatically, than average commoners. It behooves us then to learn from them and their lives, so that the Principle can also manifest itself in us in our moral and political achievement.

6. Conclusions

Enough has been said about a thoroughly typical instantiation of Chinese argument by historical narrative in the Sung Confucian thinkers, especially the "arguments" by Chu Hsi. Although quite naturally we would have liked to go further into a philosophical comparison of two modes of thinking, the Chinese and the

^② See excellent explications of this point, with many apposite quotations from Chu Hsi, in Wing-tsit Chan, *Chu Hsi* (Taipei: Tung-ta Tu-shu Kung-ssu, 1990), pp.62-66, and Ichikawa Yasushi (市川安司), *Shushi Tetsugaku Ronko* 朱子哲學論考 (Tokyo: Kyuko Shoin, 1989), pp. 80-83.

Western, this is not the place to do so. One thing is certain, however. Any philosophical typification of Chinese concrete and historical mode of thinking must be substantiated by detailed considerations in the Chinese intellectual history, as what this essay has attempted. D.C. Lau's quiet decisive words recur:²³

Chinese thinkers were in the habit of appealing to examples in history and each school has its own favourites amongst the ancient kings. For the Confucianists there were Yao and Shun, Yü, T'ang, King Wen and King Wu. Mencius, for instance, frequently cites the authority of Yao and Shun, but ancient history was for Mencius something more than an authority for occasional citation. Its significance is twofold. First, ancient personages were made concrete embodiments of moral qualities. On the one hand, Yao was the embodiment of kingly virtue, and Shun, besides being a sage king, was also the embodiment of filial virtue. On the other, Chieh and T'hou were bywords for wickedness in a ruler. Second, these idealized personages are envisaged in actual situations and these are discussed in detail and in all earnestness. For instance, after Shun became Emperor, what would he have done if his recalcitrant father, the Blind Man, were to commit murder. This serves the same purpose as the artificially contrived examples some Western philosophers use. Such as whether one should return a lethal weapon to a man. It is to give concrete shape to abstract moral problems. The example cited above raises the problem of the conflict between of a good son and the duty of a good Emperor.

Thus we can see that a knowledge of ancient history is not only necessary as a general background to the *Mencius* but is in fact something without which a good deal of the work would be unintelligible.

Echoing Lau, it may not be out of place here to conclude with my words with

²³ These words begin D. C. Lau's "Appendix 4: Ancient History as Understood by Mencius," in his *Mencius: (Volume Two)* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1979), pp. 324-333.

which I began my essay, "Historical Thinking in Classical Confucianism":²⁴

Mencius' thinking is dipped in history. He could not help but argue and persuade, and whenever he did so, he did it from history, citing historical incidents, whether ethical, political, or cosmic. And Mencius is no exception in China; all Chinese thinkers, ancient or modern, argue from history. Such an historical argumentation is very powerful because it is 'based on facts.' This historical argumentation that typifies Chinese *concrete* thinking has in itself a long historical tradition. From time immemorial, the Chinese people have been watching the way situations came and went, and learned therefrom the historical patterns of actuality, after which they pattern their behavior..... These historical matters are.....powerful symbols whose rich implications are to be drawn out by empathic participation In this manner, our present generations shape history as they are shaped hereby.

²⁴ Chun-chieh Huang, "Historical Thinking in Classical Confucianism — — Historical Argumentation from the Three Dynasties," in Chun-chieh Huang and Erik Zürcher, ed., *Time and Space in Chinese Culture* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), pp. 66-85. The quotation is from p. 74. For further elaboration from a different angle, I have to refer the reader to my "Imperial Rulership in Cultural History: Chu Hsi's Interpretation," in Frederick Brandauer and Chun-chieh Huang, eds., *Imperial Rulership and Cultural Change in Traditional China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994), pp. 188-205. Also see my "Chu Tzu tui Chung-kuo Li-shih ti Chieh-shih," in *Kuo-chi Chu-Tzu Hsueh Hui-i Lun-wen Chi* (Taipei: Chung-yang Yen-chiu Yüan Chung-kuo Wen-cheh Yen-chiu-so Ch'ou-pei Ch'u, May, 1993), pp. 1083-1114.